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Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
Democratic legal systems make law in one of two ways: by abstracting general principles
from the decisions made in individual cases (from the bottom up); or by declaring general princi-
ples through a centralized authority that are to be applied in individual cases (from the top down).
These two processes are, respectively, adjudication and legislation. Each process highlights and
hides different aspects of a legal problem. The single-case perspective of adjudication can seem
narrow, and hence inferior to the broad perspectives that legislatures can incorporate into their
decisionmaking processes. The adjudicative approach, however, has advantages that are less obvi-
ous. Notably, the adjudicative process is more likely to facilitate the adoption of simple, elegant
rules for decisionmaking. The assessment of which approach is superior is therefore indeterminate.
Each has its strengths and weaknesses that make it more or less appropriate for different context&
I. INTRODUCTION
Democratic societies make law in two ways: case-by-case adjudi-
cation by courts or adoption of general principles by legislatures
Case-by-case adjudication produces law when courts adopt general
principles to decide the outcome of individual disputes. Legislation, in
contrast, involves an abstract declaration of general principles to ap-
ply to some future set of disputes. Only rarely is legislation designed
specifically to resolve a particular dispute.2 Because both processes
produce law, they possess profound similarities. As Professor Schauer
puts it, courts not only determine how the case before them ought to
be decided, but also how other "cases of this kind ought to be de-
cided."3 Legislatures "decide how cases of some kind-[albeit] some
f Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Eli Goldston Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School.
1 Although this Essay addresses the operation of courts and legislatures, administrative
agencies also rely on these two methods, and only these two methods, to create rules. See gener-
ally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rule-Making Versus Adjudication:A Psychological Perspective, 32 Fla St
U L Rev 529 (2005) (discussing the cognitive aspects of the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication in the administrative context).
2 Exceptions exist, although they are generally symbolic. A recent legislative effort di-
rected specifically at Terry Schiavo, for example, passed into law, even though it had no effect on
the ultimate outcome. See Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub L No 109-3, 119
Stat 15 (2005) (giving Theresa Schiavo's parents standing to sue for immediate injunctive relief
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida anyone authorized to de-
prive Theresa of food, fluids, or medical treatment and declaring that the statute does not have
any precedential value for future legislation). Another effort directed at presidential advisor
Karl Rove has little chance at passage and was doubtless introduced as legislative theater. See
Charles Babington, Senate Does Battle Over Rove's Role in Plame Leak, Dueling Republican,
Democratic Amendments Fail, Wash Post A4 (July 15,2005).
3 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U Chi L Rev 883,891 (2006).
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future set of cases-ought to be decided.", Adjudication thus builds
law from the ground up, one dispute at a time. Legislation builds law
from the top down by creating general principles that cover future
disputes. This difference, though subtle, can be enough to inspire dif-
ferent resolutions to the same issues.
In fact, adjudication and legislation commonly produce different
answers to the same legal questions. For example, no court has ever
set a fixed cap on tort liability, but such caps have become a common
source of reform among state legislatures.! Similarly, other than cases
involving sovereign immunity, courts do not simply bestow immunity
from tort liability on parties out of a belief that doing so serves some
important social goal, but legislatures frequently do. These differences
likely result from the different political pressures that legislatures and
courts confront. Judges are not immune to political pressures-many
face elections just as legislators do. But judges are generally more in-
sulated from such pressures than legislators Legislative solutions to
social problems are thus more likely to reflect efforts to accommodate
competing political interests than are judicial solutions.
Legislatures also pursue fundamentally different goals than courts.
Legislatures must set budgets for the political entities they represent
and craft laws of general applicability. Their mandate demands that
they try to serve the interests of the public as a whole, which some-
times requires subordinating individual interests to the collective
good. In contrast, courts must decide individual disputes. Their man-
date is to make a good decision in each individual case. This basic dif-
ference in goals produces differences in procedures that the two insti-
4 Id.
5 See Catherine Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps,
80 NYU L Rev 391, 412-17 (2005) (noting that "state law governs medical malpractice claims"
and reviewing state variations in legislative efforts to cap damages in medical malpractice cases
through clear rules limiting compensatory damages and punitive damages). But courts some-
times impose rough caps on punitive damages as well when those awards are very large relative
to compensatory damages. See Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Dam-
ages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 59, 82
(1999) (reporting data indicating that appellate courts seem to have adopted rough rules of
thumb correlated with the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages for capping remittitur
claims in cases involving punitive damages).
6 See for example, 8 USC § 1102 (2000) (diplomatic immunity); 10 USC § 2385 (2000)
(military arms purchase tax immunity); 12 USC § 1456 (2000) (qualified immunity from law for
home mortgage corporations).
7 For an exposition about judicial independence, see generally John Ferejohn, Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S Cal L Rev 353 (1999).
8 For a general overview of the legislative process and its goals, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Phillip P Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 1-17 (Foun-
dation 2000).
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tutions follow. The legislative process necessarily consists of private
meetings, public debate, and compromise. The adjudication process
necessarily consists of resolving competing arguments-often without
compromise, but always with a focus on getting the individual case
right. Individual rights in the courts often come at the expense of the
public good, at least in the individual case. The legislature is all about
majority rule; the courts are all about due process.
Other differences between the legislative process and the judicial
process can also produce variations between the solutions to social
problems that courts and legislatures produce. Constitutions endow
each with different types of authority. Legislatures have the power to
craft rules of general applicability, whereas the courts only have the
power to decide cases. The limited authority of the courts necessarily
produces differences in the way the courts make law. Legislatures may,
at any time, make rules that cover almost any subject. Their rules may
be as broad or as narrow as they deem sensible. Courts tend not to
declare policy without a case in point before them, and limit their dec-
larations to what is necessary to resolving only that case.9
The incremental nature of the courts as compared to legislatures,
however, seems unlikely to produce different substantive rules in the
long run. Flashy issues that fade from the public sphere quickly are
more likely to influence legislatures than courts because courts can
only decide those cases that come before them. Legislatures, however,
can raise any issue they choose. Courts will thus have more limited
opportunities to address novel issues than legislatures. Persistent po-
litical and social questions inevitably come before the courts,0 but
transient issues might come and go without producing any case law.
Legislatures respond more rapidly to novel social issues, but if the
issue persists, courts will face opportunities to address it.
Legislatures and courts thus face three fundamental differences
that could produce variations in substantive rules: differences in po-
litical pressures, differences in goals, and differences in jurisdictional
authority. In his article, Professor Schauer proposes a novel difference
between courts and legislatures-that of cognitive style. As he ob-
serves, the adjudication process ensures that the courts will face a con-
9 See Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 1
(Harvard 1999) ("[Flrequently judges decide very little.... This is a pervasive practice: doing and
saying as little as is necessary in order to justify an outcome.").
10 The observation that persistent conflicts eventually present themselves for judicial reso-
lution is an old one. "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 270 (Dou-
bleday 1969) (J.P. Mayer, ed).
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crete example as they develop law." This fact arguably means that
courts produce superior law. Legislatures might fail to imagine the
potential applications of the law that they adopt. One need only re-
view the unexpected growth of statutes such as RICO-developed to
fight the mafia but used by prosecutors and private parties in all kinds
of ways the legislature would never have foreseen-to provide exam-
ples of laws with unexpected applications that now govern society.'2 Or
consider the alternative minimum tax, initially intended to fight bi-
zarre tax schemes that allowed a small number of wealthy individuals
to avoid taxes, but which has now become a major revenue source."
The Endangered Species Act likewise regulates all manner of activi-
ties that Congress never envisioned when it passed." Many argue that
the great virtue of the common law lies in its use of real cases to make
law, avoiding the foibles and unpredictability of legislation concerning
inchoate, disembodied problems." Professor Schauer, however, tells
another story. He contends that human cognitive processes ensure
that concrete examples are not illuminating sentinels guiding sensible
decisionmaking, but are will-o-wisps that can lead courts into folly.
16
The adjudicative perspective facilitates adopting different an-
swers to legal questions than a legislative perspective. The case-by-
case approach might thwart attention to general systemic variables,
highlighting instead the personalities and unique features of the par-
11 See Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 892 (cited in note 3) ("[W]hen there is a real case, the
rulemaker can see in a concrete context how the rule will play out in the actual controversies of
real life.").
12 See, for example, Nicholas R. Mancini, Comment, Mobsters in the Monastery? Applica-
bility of Civil RICO to the Clergy Sexual Misconduct Scandal and the Catholic Church, 8 Roger
Williams U L Rev 193, 196 (2002) ("In recent years, the inherent ambiguity of the statute itself,
coupled with a broad reading by the Supreme Court, has led to RICO's application in areas well
beyond its original and intended focus, including use of the statute against both tobacco compa-
nies and pro-life abortion clinic protestors.") (internal citations omitted).
13 See General Accounting Office, Alternative Minimum Tax, an Overview of its Rationale
and Impact on Individual Taxpayers 2-3 (Aug 2000), online at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/gg0O18O.pdf (visited June 11, 2006) (explaining that although the Alternative Mini-
mum Tax was aimed at a small group of people with high income but no tax liability, it now
increasingly affects middle class taxpayers and may affect as many as seventeen million taxpay-
ers by the year 2010).
14 See, for example, Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, Noah's Choice: The Future of
Endangered Species 161 (Knopf 1995) (noting that when passing the Endangered Species Act,
"[flew members of Congress ... had the 'foggiest idea of what they were doing"'). See also Ten-
nessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153 (1978) (enjoining construction of a nearly completed
dam started before the Endangered Species Act was enacted at a cost of approximately $27
million in order to prevent the extinction of a small population of snail darters).
15 See Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 883-84 (cited in note 3) (noting the conventional wis-
dom that making law through real cases may be superior to abstract construction through legis-
lation because "real litigants exemplify[] the issues the law must resolve").
16 See id at 894 ("[T]here is a substantial risk that the common law rulemaker will be
unduly influenced by the particular case before her.").
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ties. A legislative approach might do the opposite: hiding important
individual variations while highlighting general, systemic variables.
This is not to say that courts do not attend to systemic variables, or
that legislatures are not interested in individual stories. Courts often
worry about the effect that their rules will have on future litigation or
on the behavior of parties that might be the targets of future lawsuits."
Similarly, legislative hearings are filled with individual stories and tes-
timony.8 The difference, however, is one of degree and motivation.
Courts must resolve the dispute before them and need not declare
principles. Legislatures must declare general principles and do not
generally resolve single disputes. This difference necessarily alters the
perspective of the two bodies-courts focus on particular facts of a
case, whereas legislatures focus on generalized facts across a set of
cases.
Whereas Professor Schauer emphasizes the defects of the com-
mon law process, I propose that neither a common law nor a legisla-
tive approach is necessarily superior. For certain kinds of problems,
the adjudicative approach of building law from the ground up might
thwart the goals of the legal system. For others, the top-down approach
might be more troublesome. Sometimes, each leads to different an-
swers that cannot be said to be inferior or superior from a normative
perspective. I thus build upon both the observations of Professor
Schauer and on Professor Sherwin's comments."
II. COGNITIVE WEAKNESSES OF ADJUDICATION
Professor Schauer scores several excellent points against the
common law process. And, in fact, he has left several cognitive weak-
nesses for others to identify. His basic point-that adjudication and
legislation produce fundamentally different ways of thinking-has
broad support in the psychological literature on judgment and choice.
17 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 24 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992) ("[Tlhe
judge ... cannot ignore the future. Since the judge's legal ruling will be a precedent influencing the
decision of future cases, the judge must consider the probable impact of alternative rulings on the
future behavior of people.").
18 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97
Nw U L Rev 1295, 1308-10 (2003) (describing the influence of individual stories on the legisla-
tive process); Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
Stan L Rev 683, 735 (1999) ("In one common pattern, a special-interest group supplies informa-
tion to members of Congress, who then hold hearings that enable the group to testify and publi-
cize its mission.").
19 See Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 891 (cited in note 3) ("[T]he common law judge has
before her a concrete token of the type of case for which she is making a rule, while other rule-
makers make their rules without having before them in the same immediate way a particular
token of the case-type that the rule will encompass.").
20 See generally Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U Chi L Rev 919 (2006).
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And indeed, this literature identifies several other weaknesses of the
case method.
A. Context Affects Judgment and Choice
The principal insight underlying this newfound difference be-
tween adjudication and legislation is that background context influ-
ences people's judgment. Cognitive psychologists have generated dec-
ades of research that supports this conclusion." For example, difficult
problems such as the well-known Wason card-selection task become
easy when the context of the problem is changed from an abstract
brainteaser to a concrete, familiar dilemma." Compare the abstract
and contextual versions of the problem:
Abstract:
A deck of cards has letters on one side and numbers on the other.
Four cards that show "E", "F", "3", and "8" are available. To de-
termine whether the rule, "every card with a vowel also has an
odd number on the back" is true, the backsides of which two
cards must be examined? (Answer: E and 8.)3
Social Context:
Four people are sitting at a table in a bar: one is drinking beer,
one is drinking coke, one is twenty-five years old, and one is six-
teen years old. To determine whether the law requires that any-
one who is drinking alcohol be over twenty-one years old, which
two ages or beverages must you examine? (Answer: the beverage
of the sixteen-year-old and the age of the beer drinker.)
The logical structure of the problems is identical. Nevertheless,
few people answer the first problem correctly. People commonly se-
lect "E" and "3," in an effort to produce evidence confirming the rule,
rather than seeking evidence that might prove it false.24 The key to a
21 For an overview of research on human judgment, see generally Thomas Gilovich and
Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristics Then and Now, in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and
Daniel Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 1 (Cam-
bridge 2002).
22 The Wason card-selection task is "[olne of the most intriguing and widely used experi-
mental paradigms for exploring people's ability to detect violations of conditional rules." Leda
Cosmides and John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in John H. Barkow, Leda
Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds, The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation
of Culture 163, 181-83 (Oxford 1992) (concluding that the abstract versions of the Wason card-
selection task elicited fewer than 25 percent correct responses whereas the concrete version
elicited 75 percent correct responses).
23 See id at 182 fig 3.3(a).
24 Id at 181 ("Most people choose either the [E] card alone or [E]&[3]. Few people choose
the not-[3] card, even though a[n] [E] on the other side of it would falsify the rule.").
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correct answer is to search for evidence that the rule is false, not to
search for evidence that it is true. The social context of the second
problem induces an effort to identify a rule breaker, thereby facilitat-
ing the correct response.25
Similarly, Bayesian problems with detecting low-probability events
(which commonly bedevil the courts26) can be made much easier by
simply rearranging the information provided.7 The prime example of
this is the "rare disease" problem, which runs as follows: to detect a
rare disease, present in 1 in 1000 individuals, doctors administer a test
that is 90 percent accurate (meaning that among people who have the
disease, the test will be positive 90 percent of the time, and among
people without the disease, the test will be negative 90 percent of the
time). What is the probability that a patient who tests positive actually
has the disease? Many people answer "90 percent," even though the
answer is actually roughly 1 percent. " Restating the problem so as to
describe the rate of false positives and false negatives as proportions
rather than as percentages, however, facilitates an accurate under-
standing of the problem.9
The effect of context can also influence judgments of social prob-
lems for which a correct answer does not exist. For example, people
treat the loss of some good differently than they treat the gain of the
same good.J Losses feel more weighty and urgent than gains of similar
25 Id at 183 ("Experiments with the drinking age problem and other familiar social con-
tracts show that human reasoning changes dramatically depending on the subject matter one is
reasoning about.").
26 See Thomas D. Lyon and Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Pro-
bative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell L Rev 43,64 (1996):
We suspect that the false belief [by judges] that clusters of symptoms must be probative of
abuse is in part attributable to-a failure to distinguish between the probability that a par-
ticular cluster of symptoms will occur, a rare event, and the probability that a cluster of
symptoms of some sort will occur (a frequent event).
27 See Gerd Gigerenzer, Calculated Risks: How to Know When Numbers Deceive You 45-
48 (2002) (describing how presenting a problem of Bayesian reasoning using natural frequencies
rather than probabilities facilitates accurate judgment).
28 Roughly 99 individuals will test falsely negative out of 1000 (10 percent x 999 not in-
fected). Only 1 of 100 will actually be positive (100 total = 99 false positive + 1 true positive).
Thus, the probability that a patient who tests positive actually has the disease is roughly 1 per-
cent (1 true positive + 100 total tests). For an exposition on this example, see Ward Casscells,
Arno Schoenberger, and Thomas B. Graboys, Interpretations by Physicians of Clinical Labora-
tory Results, 299 New Eng J Med 999,999-1000 (1978).
29 See Ulrich Hoffrage and Gerd Gigerenzer, Using Natural Frequencies to Improve Diag-
nostic Inferences, 73 Academic Med 538,538 (1998) (reporting that presentation of patient symp-
tom information in "natural frequency format" rather than probabilities facilitates accurate
diagnosis by doctors).
30 See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039 (1991); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and
Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Polit
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magnitude, meaning people will spend more resources to avoid losing
a possession than they would acquiring the same possession.3 ' Also,
describing a choice as involving gains leads decisionmakers to make
less risky choices than when the same choice is described as involving
losses." Together, these effects produce a strong preference for the
status quo, even when the status quo is somewhat arbitrary. Choices
involving losses trigger a different way of evaluating a gamble; one in
which people are willing to take enormous risks so as to avoid certain
loss from their status quo. In contrast, choices involving gains induce
people to "lock in" sure gains even if doing so sacrifices the prospects
of a more sizeable gain.
As these common examples demonstrate, the pervasive message
of the psychological literature on judgment and choice is that context
influences decisionmaking-often more so than a decision's underly-
ing logical structure. The forum in which a decision is made therefore
will almost certainly have considerable effect on the decision itself.
Professor Schauer's assertion that the adjudicative and legislative
processes are apt to produce different resolutions to social problems
thus seems well founded.
B. The Influence of Idiosyncratic Cases on Adjudication
The lesson that context matters, however, does not favor either an
adjudicative or legislative approach to lawmaking. It simply suggests
that to the extent that the two approaches produce different contexts,
they will inspire legal decisionmakers to reach different conclusions
about appropriate responses to social problems. As Professor Schauer
indicates, however, the adjudicative approach to making legal rules
seems to present social problems in a perspective that seems cognitively
Econ 1325 (1990). See also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Fram-
ing of Decisions, 59 J Bus S251, S257-60 (1986); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 Am Psychologist 341, 342-44 (1984); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahne-
man, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453, 453-55 (1981);
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
Econometrica 263,265-69 (1979).
31 See Tversky and Kahneman, 106 0 J Econ 1039 (cited in note 30) (describing the differ-
ent hedonic responses to gains and losses); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 98 J Pol Econ at
1325 (cited in note 30) (presenting studies indicating that people value gains less than losses).
But see generally Kathryn Zeiler and Charles R. Plott, The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to
Accept Gap, the Endowment Effect, Subject Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations, 95 Am Econ Rev 530 (2005) (presenting evidence that testing errors and
subject misconceptions, rather than the so-called endowment effect, account for previous study
results indicating loss aversion).
32 Tversky and Kahneman, 59 J Bus at S259 (cited in note 30); Kahneman and Tversky, 39
Am Psychologist at 341 (cited in note 30); Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in
note 30); Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica at 279 (cited in note 30).
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inferior to the legislative approach.33 Despite conventional wisdom that
"rulemaking and lawmaking are better done when the rulemaker has
before her a live controversy,"" the live controversy can be misleading.
Courts necessarily see one case at a time, thereby giving the quirks and
oddities of the individual parties more salience in a judicial proceeding
than they would have in front of a legislature. Individual cases might
have unique characteristics that drive decisions. Aspects of an individ-
ual case that create or invoke sympathy might lead courts to make a
decision that differs from that a legislature would make.
Consider the examples that arise from the influence of counter-
factual thinking on judgment. Suppose an airplane crashes in the wilds
of the Yukon. The cause of the crash is such that the families of those
people killed in the crash are entitled to compensation. The pilot ini-
tially survives the crash, but succumbs to the bitter Arctic conditions
as he struggles towards a town. Should his compensation depend upon
whether he dies one-quarter mile from the town or whether he dies
seventy-five miles from the town? One would think not and presuma-
bly no legislature would embrace such a rule. His life is worth no less
in either case, and anyone responsible for the crash is no more or less
culpable for the loss based on how close he came to surviving. And
yet, when people are asked to assess the appropriate degree of com-
pensation in such a crash, the pilot's progress influences the award."
Subjects who read that the pilot walked ninety-nine miles expressed a
willingness to award more than subjects who read that the pilot
walked only one mile. The authors of this study explain that it is easier
to imagine that the pilot could have survived when he made it ninety-
nine miles and hence his death seems more regrettable. Judges who
see these cases one at a time are more prone to being influenced by
such factors than are legislators, who see only the aggregate situation
divorced from the details.
Individual cases also likely invoke the kinds of emotional re-
sponses that can be misleading. Consider the difference between a
trial involving the potential liability of an airline for failing to install
safety equipment and the consideration of whether an airline should
be required to install the very same safety device. Both the trial and
33 Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 888-89 (cited in note 3) ("[T]he effects of a particular case
are likely .. to distort the case-based rulemaker's ability accurately to assess the field of future
events that any prospective rule would encompass.").
34 Idat892.
35 See Dale T. Miller and Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compen-
sation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 Personality & Soc Psych Bull 513, 516-17 (1986) (discussing
the results of an experiment concluding that "the closer a negative event is to not happening, the
stronger is the reaction provoked by the event").
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the regulatory effort would likely include testimony on the relative
costs and benefits of the safety device. The trial, however, would also
include extensive individual testimony about the personal loss suf-
fered by the family of the victim. The emotional content of the testi-
mony could affect the court in several ways. First, emotional testimony
is more vivid than the pallid statistics, which would make it more
memorable and influential. Second, emotional testimony can trigger
reliance on an "affect heuristic";6 not only would courts want to find
for the plaintiff, they would feel it appropriate to do so. Judges might
even want to support the plaintiff, even without knowing exactly why."
Judges and juries are more apt to sympathize with the blameless sur-
vivors of an accident and this sympathy can lead the court to find a
way to find for the plaintiff.
By itself, the influence of the unique sympathies associated with
individual disputes would not necessarily produce misguided legal
rules. If judges refrain from creating legal rules in unique or unusual
cases, then the sympathies and emotions of an individual case would
have no influence on the adoption of legal rules. The problem, as Pro-
fessor Schauer notes, is the influence of a common cognitive process-
the "availability heuristic."' The availability heuristic refers to the ten-
dency for easily remembered events to seem more common than
those that are more difficult to recall. 39 Because the case before the
judge is vivid, salient, and therefore memorable, judges might over-
state the frequency with which similar facts occur. Relying on the ex-
tensive literature demonstrating the influence of availability, Professor
Schauer argues that a judge might often fail to appreciate the unusual
nature of a case before him and, instead, think the fact pattern common.4O
36 For a general discussion of the affect heuristic, see Paul Slovic, et al, The Affect Heuristic,
in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and Biases: The Psy-
chology of Intuitive Judgment 397 (Cambridge 2002).
37 Such decisions might be explained by a "social intuitionist" model of moral judgment.
See generally Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Tail and the Rational Dog: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 Psych Rev 814 (2001) (presenting a model of moral judgment
that characterizes those judgments not as rational, but intuitive, almost automatic, evaluations
only after which post hoc ratiocination takes place).
38 See Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 894-96 (cited in note 3) (discussing the role of availabil-
ity in the common law rulemaking process).
39 For a general description of the availability heuristic, see Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1127-28 (1974).
See also Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 683 (cited in note 18) (discussing the application
of availability to the lawmaking process).
40 See Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev at 894 (cited in note 3) ("[D]ecisionmakers ... often be-
lieve that the most proximate member of a class is representative of the class.").
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Research by Keith Holyoak and Dan Simon on the tendency to
generalize rules supports Schauer's conclusion.4' In their work, these
researchers asked people to make a judgment about whether a defen-
dant should be liable for posting allegedly defamatory material on the
Internet.42 The judgment required that the participants decide whether
Internet bulletin boards were analogous to newspapers and hence sub-
ject to greater protection from libel suits. The researchers also manipu-
lated evidence about the defendant's character. Participants who read
of the defendant's positive character traits were inclined to find for the
defendant and participants who read of the defendant's negative char-
acter traits were inclined to find against the defendant. By itself, that
result represents an unfortunate demonstration of the power of charac-
ter evidence, but is not that surprising." Evidence of the defendant's
character, however, also influenced the participants' judgments con-
cerning whether the Internet is like a newspaper. Participants altered
their judgments concerning the appropriate analogy so as to be consis-
tent with their desire to find for or against the defendant. If judges ex-
hibit a similar degree of consistency, then sympathies toward individual
cases might well affect rules that courts adopt.
To be sure, legislatures certainly cannot be said to be occupied by
people devoid of sympathy or free of cognitive errors. Legislatures
review individual testimony in hearings and politicians are famous for
public expressions of empathy. Former President Clinton, for example,
was often described as America's "Mourner in Chief.""' Unlike adjudi-
cation, however, legislation does not require that such testimony exist.
And unlike judges, politicians are not forced to confront emotional
testimony nor address it.
41 See generally Keith J. Holyoak and Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision
Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J Exp Psych: Gen 3 (1999). See also Dan Simon, A Third
View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U Chi L Rev 511,537-
40(2004).
42 See Holyoak and Simon, 128 J Exp Psych: Gen at 5-10 (cited in note 41).
43 See Sarah Tanford and Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting
Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 Law & Hum Beh 477 (1988) (present-
ing research on the effect of character evidence on a judgment in a products liability case); Sarah
Tanford and Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evi-
dence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc Beh 165, 178-79 (1987) (presenting research
on the effect of character evidence on a judgment in a tort case).
44 See Margaret Carlson, A President Finds His Voice: Bush Began to Look Like a Leader
When He Threw Out the Script, 158 Time 50, 50 (Sept 24, 2001) (noting that "Clinton was ridi-
culed once upon a time as Mourner in Chief, but in truth he didn't own the office until the tears
ran down his cheeks as he comforted the survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing").
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C. Adjudication Fails to Embrace a Prospective, Categorical
Approach to Making Law
Legislation also involves two other features that minimize the
likely impact of emotional content on decisionmaking. First, it is pro-
spective. Courts usually act in response to some inflicted harm after it
occurs and will thus always have injured victims or aggrieved parties
before them. Legislatures make rules to govern future conduct and
hence, legislatures act without knowing precisely how individuals will
be affected by the rules they adopt or even who might be affected. To
be sure, legislatures often act in response to some disaster.5 When they
do, they behave much like courts, taking testimony from individuals
who have been harmed, and adopt some measure to prevent precisely
the same harm. Likewise, courts sometimes act prospectively, issuing
injunctions against future harm. But these variations only illustrate
the general principle that courts usually act retrospectively and legis-
latures act prospectively. Even when legislators respond to some spe-
cific disaster, they are aware that they are not assigning culpability and
compensation for past harm, they are making rules to govern future
conduct. Similarly, even though courts grant injunctive relief to govern
future conduct, it is directed only at those specific parties before the
court.
Second, legislatures are exposed to tradeoffs that are not part of
judicial proceedings. Many legislatures, in fact, spend the bulk of their
time on the budget process, which necessarily involves tradeoffs."6 Legis-
latures are keenly aware that money spent on one project either will
be taken from another, will require a tax increase, or will be added to
a deficit." Legislative mandates to private parties or subordinate po-
litical entities do not entail the same tradeoffs, but these mandates
occur in an institution that is accustomed to making tradeoffs. Fur-
thermore, legislatures often commission research to measure the costs
45 Consider Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 691-703 (cited in note 18) (presenting
three examples of congressional responses to specific disasters-(a) Love Canal, in which a
chemical company filled public waterways with 21,000 tons of chemical waste, (b) the use of the
chemical pesticide Alar, and (c) the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996-as examples of irrational
legislation due to effects of the availability heuristic).
46 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 181-82
(cited in note 8) (discussing the federal budget process and noting that, for example, 40 percent
of the work of the Senate consists of budget-related activity).
47 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of the Offset Requirement in
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U Chi L Rev 501,561-68 (1998) (discussing how the constraints of
the budget process inspire congressional reviews of spending and policy).
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associated with regulatory decisions." Even if they do not, lobbyists
and those trying to influence the legislative process will often make
such research available to those legislators sympathetic to their goals.
Courts, by contrast, usually lack such information or even shun it ex-
plicitly.9 Exceptions exist, but they are exceptions. In products liability
design defects cases, for example, liability depends upon a showing
that the benefits of a safety precaution outweigh its costs.", And for
their part, legislatures are perfectly capable of acting without any un-
derstanding the costs of their activity.1 The job of a legislator, how-
ever, is to make tradeoffs. The job of a judge is to resolve disputes.
Legislatures will face such tradeoffs directly, whereas courts will see
these tradeoffs as only distantly related to the case before them.
Once again, psychological research supports the notion that de-
ciding social problems one case at a time can also distort a sense of
scale and proportion. In one study of such distortions, Cass Sunstein
and his colleagues asked subjects to assign punitive damage awards to
cases involving an egregious example of fraud, a significant physical
injury arising from egregious conduct in products liability, or both.52
Participants who evaluated the fraud case alone assigned higher dam-
age awards than subjects who evaluated the products liability case
alone. When evaluated together, however, the products case drew
higher awards than the fraud case. 3 The authors explain that the fraud
case was a rather outrageous instance of fraud relative to the subjects'
expectations about fraud, and thus the contrast with expectations pro-
48 See generally Cass Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 Stan L Rev 247 (1996) (discussing increased congressional enthusiasm for regulatory
cost-benefit analysis after 1994).
49 See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act, 52 Stan L Rev 547, 586
(2000) ("A major puzzle raised by the performance of the courts is that many of the most well-
known cases involving punitive damages are also those in which corporations undertook a risk
analysis, or in some cases, a sound benefit-cost analysis.").
50 See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 Cornell L Rev 867, 887-904 (1998) (arguing that courts have embraced
risk-utility analysis as a test for defective designs).
51 For example, scholars have accused Congress of adopting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
rapid response to a perceived crisis in the securities market without having any notion of the
costs and benefits of the far-reaching legislation they were adopting. See Larry E. Ribstein, Sar-
box: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 Mich St L Rev 279, 280, 284-92 (2004) ("Congress acted hastily
in designing a vaccine for the market's ills with little understanding of what caused the disease.").
52 See Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan L Rev 1153,1173-
79 (2002).
53 See id at 1176:
When cases from categories that differ in prominence are viewed in isolation, the effect of
the category is suppressed. As a result, the more prominent harm is assigned a lower rating
and a lower dollar value when judged by itself than when directly compared to a harm of a
less prominent kind.
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duced a high award. The personal injury seemed like a more common
sort of personal injury and did not produce such a contrast. When the
subjects evaluated the two cases together, however, they were re-
minded that reckless conduct that inflicts physical injuries is more
outrageous than reckless conduct that inflicts only financial injuries'4
Contrast effects such as this are far more likely to influence courts,
who see only one case at a time, than legislatures, who can make
broader comparisons.
Careful statistical reasoning is also apt to be more difficult in an
individual case than in the aggregate. As discussed earlier, represent-
ing statistical evidence in frequencies rather than probabilities can
dramatically improve the accuracy of human inference." Several cog-
nitive errors can be avoided by casting a decision as one involving
frequencies (for example, 1 in 10) rather than percentages (for exam-
ple, 10 percent). For example the conjunctive fallacy, which is the ten-
dency to see the likelihood that two independent events will both oc-
cur as more probable than the likelihood that either event will occur
alone, seems to diminish when participants are asked to generate fre-
quencies of events, rather than assign probabilities.6 Similarly, base-
rate neglect, the tendency to ignore the rate at which an event occurs,
seems to affect probability estimates stated in percentages more than
estimates stated in relative frequencies." Furthermore, a frequency
format does not seem to elicit the overconfident judgments that sub-
jective probability estimates produce. 8
Single cases tend to trigger a subjective format and hide the com-
monalities a case might have with a broader category." A case-by-case
approach makes the facts seem unique, whereas legislatures cannot
54 See id at 1178 ("The comparison of cases drawn from different categories restores dif-
ferences between categories of harms that differ in prominence, and in most cases, this should be
considered an improvement in the quality of judgment.").
55 See Gigerenzer, Calculated Risks at 48 (cited in note 27).
56 See Barbara Mellers, Ralph Hertwig, and Daniel Kahneman, Do Frequency Representa-
tions Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration 12 Psych Sci 269,
269-71 (2001) (presenting conflicting evidence as to whether frequency representations elimi-
nate the conjunctive fallacy).
57 See generally Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians
after All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty, 58
Cognition 1 (1996) (arguing that humans think of statistical information in terms of absolute
numbers or frequencies rather than probabilities, and therefore that framing information in
absolute terms eliminates the cognitive biases of base-rate neglect, probabilistic reasoning, and
the conjunction fallacy).
58 See Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics
and Biases" 2 Eur Rev Soc Psych 83,87-90 (1991).
59 See Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 Mgmt Sci 17, 23 (1993) (arguing that people tend to make deci-
sions one at a time, ignoring the effect of those decisions on future decisionmaking).
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avoid seeing the aggregation of cases that their rules might affect.
Courts notoriously mishandle statistical information in particular.-
Courts often reject reliance on statistical information, even when it is
relevant.' In other instances, they treat statistical evidence as wholly
dispositive, even when it is merely suggestive.62 The widely accepted
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in fact, is founded precisely on a logical
61fallacy akin to base-rate neglect. Courts also demonstrably rely on
outcome evidence that could not have been known beforehand when
assessing the liability of trustees for imprudent distribution of a trust's
assets." Courts have a lengthy history of embracing logical fallacies
that arise from a narrow, subjective perspective and cementing them
into broad legal principles.6
D. Adjudication's Excessive Emphasis on Individual Responsibility
The adjudicative process is also necessarily focused on assigning
responsibility to individuals. A long tradition of research in social psy-
chology indicates that the process of assigning credit and blame leads
people to attribute too much behavior to stable personality traits and
not enough to the power of situations.6 People, at least in Western
cultures, tend to attribute behavior excessively to stable traits while
ignoring aspects of a situation that can induce behavior, a phenome-
non called the "fundamental attribution error."" We are too quick to
60 For a general discussion of the use of probability in courts, see Jonathan J. Koehler, One in
Million_, Billions and Trillions: Lessons from People v. Collins (1968) for People v. Simpson (1995),
47 J Legal Educ 214 (1997) (discussing common misinterpretations of statistical evidence in the
courtroom); Jonathan J. Koehler and Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accu-
racy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 Cornell L Rev 247 (1990)
(arguing that the use of "overtly probabilistic" evidence increases jury verdict accuracy).
61 See, for example, Smith v Rapid Transit, Inc, 317 Mass 469, 58 NE2d 754, 755 (1945),
quoting Sargent v Mass Accident Co, 307 Mass 246,29 NE2d 825,827 (1940) (rejecting the use of
the raw statistical fact that the defendant bus company owned the majority of buses in a particu-
lar township where an accident occurred as a basis for liability because "it is not enough that
mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to be proved").
62 See, for example, Jonathan J. Koehler, Probabilities in the Courtroom: An Evaluation of
the Objections and Policies, in Dorothy K. Kagehiro and William S. Laufer, eds, Handbook of
Psychology and Law 167 (Springer 1992).
63 See generally David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res lpsa Loquitur, 77 Mich L Rev
1456 (1979) (noting the ambiguity of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when examined using
probability theory).
64 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?,
79 Or L Rev 61, 79-81 (2000) (discussing the influence of hindsight bias on trustee liability).
65 See id at 79-93 (discussing how the hindsight bias and fallacies arising from the repre-
sentativeness heuristic have affected the development of law in undesirable ways).
66 See Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of So-
cial Psychology 27-28 (McGraw-Hill 1991).
67 See Lee D. Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in L. Berkowitz, ed, 10 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 173,
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assume that an ordinary misstep is the result of clumsiness rather than
a wet floor, that a dour expression indicates an unfriendly demeanor
rather than a passing mood, and that the wrong answer to a trick ques-
tion indicates low intelligence. The ordinary social interactions of eve-
ryday life seem to focus our attention onto the personality of those
whom we encounter. The external forces that often actually govern
people's behavior are less visible and have less influence on attribu-
tions of responsibility. Assuming that judges and juries are no differ-
ent than other adults, when they sit in judgment over others in the
courts they likely attribute too much blame to individuals and not
enough to social forces.-
Classic studies in social psychology demonstrate that the funda-
mental attribution error arises, in part, out of the way people direct
their attention.6' Even though the situational influences on other peo-
ple's behavior are often invisible, people have little trouble seeing the
influence of external forces on their own behavior. The fundamental
attribution error is a mistake people make about others, not them-
selves. Individuals will commonly attribute their own behavior to the
product of the situation in which they find themselves, even as those
who observe them attribute it to some stable aspect of their personal-
ity.'0 Psychologists believe that this "actor-observer" effect results from
the salience of the situation to the actor relative to the salience of the
actor to the observer. The trial process places the individual front and
center, thereby highlighting their behavior and perhaps facilitating the
commission of the fundamental attribution error.
The legislative approach to making law, in contrast, highlights so-
cial forces. It directs decisionmakers' attention to economic factors and
social trends, facilitating a sociological perspective on regulating human
activity. A casual perusal of the development of almost every area of
law demonstrates that courts attend to the characteristics of individual
actors while legislatures regulate social settings. Tort law, for example,
would not allow a plaintiff to recover from a manufacturer of alcohol,
firearms, or cigarettes merely because that manufacturer put these
184-87 (Academic 1977) (discussing the fundamental attribution error as the "general tendency
to overestimate the importance of personal or dispositional factors relative to environmental
influences").
68 See Lee Ross and Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice, 97 Nw U L Rev 1081, 1092-96 (2003) (arguing that "when called upon to
account for the past behavior of other individuals or to make predictions about the future behav-
ior of those individuals, we tend to underestimate the impact of situational or environmental
factors and overestimate the importance of 'dispositional' factors") (internal citations omitted).
69 See Ross and Nisbett, The Person and the Situation at 27 (cited in note 66).
70 See generally Richard E. Nisbett, et al, Behavior as Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the
Observer, 27 J Personality & Soc Psych 154 (1973) (presenting research on the actor-observer effect).
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products on the market.7' The manufacturer has to be blameworthy in
some fashion, by selling unsafe versions of such products. But Congress
regulates the sale of these goods in exacting detail.72 Property law will
not allow me to recover from my neighbor for driving a sport utility
vehicle that contributes greatly to air pollution unless the neighbor's
use of that vehicle infringes directly upon my ability to use my own
property." Environmental law, in contrast, regulates the use of automo-
biles extensively." Contract law would allow a used-car salesman to sell
a badly dysfunctional car "as is," so long as no fraud was involved.5
State and federal laws on the sale of automobiles, however, mandate
warranties and provide consumers with a far greater array of rights than
might be included in many sales contracts.6
In all of these cases, legislatures adopt such measures out of a be-
lief that the broader context in which these encounters occur justifies
such intervention. In contrast, courts are reluctant to regulate the econ-
omy that produces guns, alcohol or cigarettes. Courts take the society
that produces such products as given and try to regulate only the inter-
action between individuals harmed by the products and the manufac-
turers. Legislatures have no such qualms. They directly manage the
economy and the products that enter into it. Likewise, courts regulate
property disputes only when the harm caused between neighbors re-
quires some resolution. Both state and national legislatures, however,
treat environmental concerns on a social level. Numerous environ-
mental statutes regulate almost every aspect of industrial production,
71 See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability without Defect, 66 NYU L Rev 1263, 1329 (1991)
(asserting that courts have largely rejected the idea that they may categorically ban products).
72 Whole agencies, notably the Consumer Products Safety Commission and the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration, are devoted to regulating consumer product
safety and banning products deemed unsafe.
73 A successful nuisance suit requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant
have engaged in a substantial interference with another's interest in "the private use and enjoy-
ment of land." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1977). At least one court rejected as nonjus-
ticiable a lawsuit brought on behalf of everyone living in Los Angeles affected by air pollution
against anyone contributing to air pollution. See Diamond v General Motors Corp, 20 Cal App
3d 374,97 Cal Rptr 639,645 (1971).
74 The Clean Air Act includes extensive provisions governing automobile emissions. See 42
USC §§ 7521-54 (1990).
75 See David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [UCL..TA.]: The
Consumer's Perspective, 63 La L Rev 27, 37 (2002) ("Used car sales involve a similar lack of
warranty protection, but have given rise to legislation and case law affording consumers' rights
against 'lemons' which inevitably turn up in the marketplace.") (internal citations omitted).
76 See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 USC §§ 2301-12 (2000) (requiring sellers of
consumer products with warranties to provide detailed and clear information about the warranty
to consumers before purchase and forbidding disclaimer or modification of implied warranties of
merchantability). Several states have similar provisions. See, for example, NY Gen Bus
Law § 198-b (McKinney 2004); NJ Stat §§ 56:12-29 (West 2001).
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and many statutes assign responsibility for cleanup without regard to
individual fault." Whereas the common law largely treats contracts as
a matter of shared promises between autonomous individuals, legisla-
tures attend to concerns that people enter into agreements that are
one-sided, due to psychological, social, and economic pressures. To
address such concerns, legislatures adopt consumer-protection laws
that courts would never embrace. Rather than hold parties responsible
for the agreements they enter into, such laws blame social and eco-
nomic context for unfortunate promises and preclude people from
making such agreements. 7
The common law is not monolithic in its emphasis on individual
responsibility-it contains pockets of social attribution. Notably, con-
tract law includes the doctrines of unconscionability and duress, under
which courts will refrain from enforcing contracts entered into under
coercive circumstances.7' Applying these doctrines requires courts to
review the social and economic circumstances that produced the con-
tract actively.'O A determination that enforcing a contract would be
unconscionable, or that the contract was the product of coercion or
duress, entails a judgment that the circumstances, rather than the
party's actual intent or desire to enter the contract, induced a party to
enter into the contract.8' These doctrines are, however, the exception
to the general rule that parties will be held to the terms of their agree-
ments. Relative to the legislative process, the common law has pro-
duced far fewer instances in which an individual's behavior is attrib-
uted to circumstances rather than to an individual's intent. Having
developed law in a context in which the principal task is to assign
blame, courts have largely adopted rules that attribute most behavior
to people, rather than circumstances, just as social psychological re-
search predicts.
Legislatures thus seem to have a perspective that is better suited
to managing social and economic interactions. Courts are apt to attend
to misleading signals and be persuaded by the emotional content in
77 See Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan
L Rev 1333,1334-41 (1985) (calling the contemporary system of environmental regulation in the
United States an example of "Soviet-style central planning").
78 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw U L
Rev 1165, 1178-82 (2003) (discussing paternalistic legislative interventions into contract law).
79 See Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of
Contemporary Theories of Contract Law 129-43 (Kluwer 1997) (explaining the justification for,
history of, and application of the unconscionability and duress doctrines in contract law).
80 See Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 NYU L Rev 429, 456-58 (2002) (discussing the factors that influence uncon-
scionability).
81 See Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law at 129-43,179-81 (cited in note 79).
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individual cases, are generally unable or unwilling to assess how the
disputes that come before them affect broad social and economic con-
siderations, and are likely to focus excessively on individual conduct.
These factors further support Professor Schauer's view that cases make
bad law.
III. COGNITIVE WEAKNESSES OF LEGISLATION
Legislators are likely to be subject to their own set of cognitive
errors. The perspective of the legislature is necessarily different than
that of a court, which means the cognitive processes upon which legis-
lators rely will necessarily differ from those of judges. In turn, this
gives legislatures different strengths and weaknesses than courts. De-
termining whether the cognitive perspective of the adjudication proc-
ess produces superior law to that of the legislative process requires
assessing not just the vices of the adjudication process relative to the
lawmaking process, but also its virtues. Courts have several advantages
over legislatures that might facilitate superior lawmaking.
A. Courts Adapt over Time
Professor Sherwin notes that one of the strengths of the adjudica-
tion process is its ability to learn over time." Contemporary psycho-
logical research on judgment and choice supports her observations.
Even as psychologists have identified cognitive limitations that can
produce erroneous decisionmaking, they have also found people to be
remarkably adaptive decisionmakers. Over time, judges might learn
to avoid the myopic focus on individuals that leads them to neglect
broader forces that produce the disputes they adjudicate. This might
mean that courts, as institutions, evolve over time to take a broader
perspective, much like the legislature, and avoid common cognitive
errors. In particular, courts might develop rules of evidence and pro-
cedure that facilitate sensible inferences and deter harmful ones. For
example, the evidentiary prohibitions on character evidence might be
82 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Governmental Design, 87 Cornell L Rev 549, 572-75 (2002) (discussing cognitive errors among
legislators).
83 Sherwin, 73 U Chi L Rev at 925 (cited in note 20).
84 See Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in Gerd Gigerenzer and R. Selton, eds,
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 37,46-48 (MIT 2001) (arguing that cognitive heuris-
tics are based on human cognitive limitations and are well suited for special context-specific
purposes often producing fast and "computationally" cheap decisions). See generally John W.
Payne, James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson, The Adaptive Decision Maker (Cambridge 1993)
(arguing that people select from different decisionmaking strategies depending on the context of
the decision based on tradeoffs between accuracy and difficulty of use).
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a means of responding to the common tendency to attribute behavior
too quickly to stable personality traits." Prohibiting testimony about
an individual's personality presumably reduces the extent to which a
judge or jury might make unwarranted inferences about criminal pro-
clivities. Similarly, courts have embraced several presumptions that
guard against the influence that the hindsight bias might otherwise
have on their judgment.8
The fact that courts are not a monolithic entity also gives them an
advantage that legislatures lack. The common law process is a process
of trial and error with both parallel and hierarchical mechanisms for
improving legal rules. The hierarchical appellate process offers a means
of correcting a foolish legal rule produced at trial. Appellate judges also
suffer from cognitive limitations, but will have a slightly different per-
spective on the underlying legal issues than a trial judge. The appellate
process is still motivated by an effort to resolve a single case, but the
appellate court is more removed from the vagaries and sympathies that
arise in the trial process. In fact, appellate courts often express great
deference to the decisions of trial courts because the appellate courts
worry about making judgments about factual issues with only a "cold
transcript" before them. ' If Professor Schauer's thesis is correct, this
deference might be misplaced. The emotional content in a single case
might affect the trial court in a way that a more distant appellate court
might be able to avoid. In any case, appellate courts are not deferential
with regards to the law. The salient, vivid facts of underlying cases are
less prominent in the appellate process than at trial, thereby mitigating
the untoward influences Professor Schauer identifies.
The judicial process also produces a parallel authority. One court's
pronouncement of a legal rule might be contradicted by the conclu-
sions of a coequal court in a different jurisdiction. Even identifying
85 See Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S, Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal L Rev 1051, 1087 (2000) (asserting
that evidentiary rules sometimes exclude character evidence because "[ulsing the representa-
tiveness heuristic, many jurors are likely to conclude that because the defendant has the appear-
ance of a criminal (in that he has a felony conviction), he therefore must have committed the
crime for which he is charged"). But see Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the
Object of Trial, 101 Colum L Rev 1227, 1242-46 (2001) (reviewing these arguments, but ulti-
mately contending that cognitive errors do not justify such restrictions).
86 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U
Chi L Rev 571, 607-24 (1998) (describing how courts have adapted to the influence of the hind-
sight bias).
87 See Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magic Number Three: Psychological Bases for
Standards of Decision, 72 Cornell L Rev 1115, 1128 (1987) ("On issues of judge-found fact, the
appellate court normally defers to the trial court's view, reversing only if that view is clearly
erroneous and thus generates 'the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted."'), quoting United States v United States Gypsum Co, 333 US 364,395 (1948).
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the present state of the law by sifting through common law opinions is
no easy task for lawyers or law professors. Many areas of law generate
thousands of cases, but the law can be found in only a handful of deci-
sions thought to constitute a sensible statement of the governing legal
rule. Even if many courts adopt a misguided approach to an issue, so
long as lawyers, professors, and subsequent courts have the means of
identifying the sensible decisions of their predecessors, the misguided
rulings will lose influence.
To the extent that the hierarchical nature of the courts and the
presence of parallel authority serve as ways of correcting error, then
one institution in the system stands out as a source of cognitive error
that cannot easily be corrected-the United States Supreme Court. It
is at the top of its hierarchy, and like state supreme courts, it faces no
realistic chance that its decisions will be reversed.n Unlike the state
courts, however, the Supreme Court lacks parallel authority from
other jurisdictions with which to compare its resolution to legal prob-
lems. Occasionally, justices of the Supreme Court refer to the law of
other nations, but these efforts are rare, and sometimes met with scorn
by politicians or other justices of the Court." Professor Schauer has
thus properly focused his concerns on the judges in the higher courts
and relies on many examples of lawmaking by the Supreme Court.,°
Owing to the insulation of the Court from other perspectives, the
common law of the Constitution is more vulnerable to the influence of
cognitive error than the ordinary common law.
Interestingly, this analysis suggests that Erie Railroad Co v
Tompkins9' may well have been one of the most insightful decisions
the Supreme Court has ever produced. In deciding that the common
law must be generated through decentralized state procedure, the
Court preserved the prospects for experimentation and error correc-
tion. Once Justice Brandeis and his colleagues embraced the notion
88 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 Yale L J 331, 416 (1991) (noting that Congress rarely overturns statutory interpreta-
tions adopted by the United States Supreme Court).
89 For example, in declaring the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to juvenile of-
fenders, Justice Kennedy cited international trends. See Roper v Simmons 543 US 551,575 (2005)
("Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under
[eighteen] finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."). Even though Jus-
tice Kennedy. writing for the Court in Roper, also noted that "this reality does not become con-
trolling," id, the citation drew criticism from his own colleagues on the Court. Justice Scalia, in
dissent, asserted that "the basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law should
conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand." Id at 624 (Scalia
dissenting).
90 See generally Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev 883 (cited in note 3).
91 304 US 64 (1938).
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that the common law courts were creating, not finding, law, they implic-
itly recognized the possibility of multiple answers to the same social
problems.9 A decentralized process means that the vagaries of an indi-
vidual case will have less influence on the evolution of the law as a
whole. The Erie holding, and the accompanying opinion, have long been
recognized as having many virtues;93 the assessment of the cognitive
aspects of lawmaking adds one more. The cognitive analysis suggests
that the Erie Court, in an uncharacteristically humble moment, may
have saved the evolution of the common law from an array of cognitive
errors that a centralized process might otherwise cement into law.
Legislative action, in contrast, is essentially final until the legisla-
ture revisits the issue. To be sure, parallel legislative authority exists in
that various states can adopt different solutions to the same legal
problems. But the mechanisms and institutions for comparing and
contrasting rules in different jurisdictions used to synthesize a uniform
legal rule in a Restatement or treatise are largely absent or at least are
not highly influential. Likewise, although individual testimony that can
influence legislation often occurs at the committee or subcommittee
level in legislatures, thereby creating a parallel to the trial court and
appellate court process, a significant difference exists. Trial judges who
hear the individual testimony do not sit on appellate courts, but the
same legislators who heard testimony and questioned witnesses vote
in both the committee and the full legislature. Furthermore, the full
legislature is not really an institution designed to correct the errors of
its committees and subcommittees in the way appellate courts are de-
signed to correct the mistakes of the trial courts. The full legislature
generally only reviews legislation in those instances in which the com-
mittees support it-negative determinations are not reviewed. Thus,
despite superficial similarities between the legislative process and the
court system, the legislative process lacks the essential character of the
common law process in creating hierarchical and parallel mechanisms
for reviewing judgment.
B. Courts Approach Problems from Multiple Frames
The repeated experimentation inherent in a system of parallel
courts can circumvent many of the pitfalls of judgment that can plague
legislatures. The decentralized nature of the common law process in
92 See id at 79 ("[T]he law of [a] State exist[s] by the authority of that State without regard
to what it may have been in England or anywhere else."), quoting Black & White Taxicab Co v
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co, 276 US 518,533 (1927) (Holmes dissenting).
93 For one positive assessment, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive
Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century
America 95-114, 132-40,172-91 (Yale 2000).
[73:933
Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking
the United States might, for example, mitigate the influence of fram-
ing effects on decisions. A legislature approaches most social problems
from a single, natural frame created by the status quo. For example,
when a legislature considers outlawing or restricting some business
practice it faces a natural status quo. Consider low initial "teaser rates"
for credit cards, as one example." Those consumers who are seen as
victims of the practice will benefit from such legislation, and those
businesses that engage in the practice will suffer the cost of not being
able to undertake it in the future. Unlike legislatures, courts will con-
front the same underlying issue from a variety of perspectives. Some
consumers will appear before the courts as plaintiffs, arguing that the
business practice is sufficiently unconscionable or outrageous that the
courts should restore their property or money to them. Such cases will
resemble the frame that the legislature sees, where consumers (or in a
court case, a single consumer) are seeking a benefit at the expense of a
group of businesses (or in a court case, a single business). In other
cases, businesses will appear before the courts seeking to force a con-
sumer to live up to the terms of the agreement. In these cases, the
business is seeking a benefit at the expense of the consumer. The con-
text of a single dispute can alter the frame in which the courts review
the problem, even as the legislature remains stuck in a single frame.
The various default conditions that courts face will have two
beneficial effects with respect to framing. First, the differences in
frame might lead individual courts to adopt different legal rules. As
case law accumulates, the courts might select from these rules the
most sensible without regard to frame. Second, the courts might notice
that the status quo is having an undesirable effect on the rules that
they are adopting. In turn, this might lead courts to be able to step
outside of the frame and see the kinds of disputes that they face from
a broader perspective than the default presents. One way to avoid the
effects of framing is to try to recast the dispute so as to see it from
multiple perspectives.95 The process of lawmaking by adjudication, in
effect, does just that.
94 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw U L Rev 1373, 1416-28 (2004) (arguing
that cognitive errors in consumers' use of credit cards have produced inefficiently excessive
borrowing).
95' See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 Cornell L Rev 777, 822-23 (2001) ("Considering a decision from different perspectives does
not necessarily eliminate the effects of decision frames, but it can reveal to the decision maker
the arbitrary nature of a frame's influence.").
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C. Courts Have Limited Remedial Authority
Courts have a much more limited range of remedial authority
than legislatures. They can award monetary damages to a particular
party or enjoin the activities of a single individual or entity.9 Legisla-
tures, by contrast, can adopt almost any imaginable solution to a social
problem. They can tax or subsidize an activity, regulate precisely how
an activity may be undertaken, or forbid an activity altogether.' This
range of authority is doubtless essential to solving some social prob-
lems that are not amenable to the resolution by adjudication. 8 But
even as the scope of legislative authority confers the power necessary
to resolving many social problems, it might create a cognitive trap for
legislatures. Legislatures might be tempted to use their limitless regu-
latory authority in ways that are overly ambitious.
The psychological concern that the limitless regulatory authority
of the legislature raises is that of excess tailoring of regulatory solu-
tions. That is to say, legislatures might adopt a solution so closely tied
to the details of the problem as they see it that the solution fails to
address the underlying social problem. The concept of excess tailoring
in problems of judgment arises directly from work in psychology and
statistics." In some circumstances, simple decision rules predict future
results better than the results of a multiple regression analysis. The
reason for this is that multiple regression can "overfit" the data.'O° Re-
gression is tailored tightly to the unique pattern of data analyzed, so
much so that a regression equation might be unreliable when it is ap-
plied to new data. Simplistic prediction rules, however, are sometimes
more robust. Hence, in some instances simpler rules can generate
more accurate predictions than multiple regression.
Examples of excessive tailoring by legislatures can be identified in
the United States. In the late 1970s, for example, Congress became in-
96 See Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Remedies § 1.1 at 3 (West 1973) ("[R]emedies
[are] either equitable or legal.").
97 See Robert V. Percival, et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 121-31
(Aspen 4th ed 2003) (describing the options available to regulators in the environmental context).
98 See Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Houston L Rev 27,
28-33 (1987) (discussing the limitations of the common law in addressing environmental problems).
99 Consider Jean Czerlinski, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Daniel G. Goldstein, How Good Are
Simple Heuristics?, in Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter Todd, and the ABC Group, eds, Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart 97 (Oxford 1999) (demonstrating that the best strategy for decisionmaking
varies depending on context, with simple strategies that account only for few facts frequently
performing just as well if not better than complex modeling strategies).
100 See Laura Martignon and Ulrich Hoffrage, Why Does One-Reason Decision Making
Work? A Case Study in Ecological Rationality, in Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Group, eds, Simple
Heuristics That Make Us Smart 119, 140 (cited in note 99) (arguing that individuals use simple
decision heuristics when time for the decision is short, the cost of error is low, or a strong factual
cue is available).
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terested in addressing the problem of abandoned hazardous-waste dis-
posal facilities, largely due to reports in the news media of a single inci-
dent that occurred in Niagara Falls, New York, in a neighborhood called
Love Canal.'°' Love Canal was a working class neighborhood that had
been constructed on an abandoned canal project into which a chemical
company had dumped thousands of barrels of hazardous waste. By the
late 1970s barrels of this abandoned waste had begun to leak and
waste escaped into the backyards and basements of the residents. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ultimately recommended
that pregnant women and young children abandon their homes.
Common law litigation by the homeowners against the chemical com-
pany seemed an unsatisfactory means of redressing the situation, and
Congress ultimately adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act '02 (CERCLA) to address the
problem of abandoned hazardous-waste facilities.' 3 CERCLA required
the EPA to begin cleanup of hazardous-waste facilities and enabled the
EPA to recover for the cost of cleanup from anyone who deposited the
waste and any present or past landowner of the site. The standard of li-
ability was strict-those involved in the sites could not defend themselves
by arguing that they took reasonable steps to avoid harming people.
Although hailed by many environmentalists as a laudable advance
in the law, others have criticized the statute for imposing excessive costs
on industry and for making it difficult to develop land that might be
contaminated by prior disposal.tn Furthermore, CERCLA has forced
industry and government to spend enormous sums on an issue that is
not, by any measure, the most serious of the modem environmental
problems.'5 Many, including the EPA, have argued that abandoned
101 See Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 696-98 (cited in note 18) (describing the events
of Love Canal and the congressional and executive response thereto). See also Gigerenzer, The
Adaptive Toolbox at 47 (cited in note 84) ("Overfitting occurs when a model with more parameters
fits a sample of data better than a model with fewer parameters but makes less-accurate predictions
for a new data sample than the simpler model.").
102 42 USC §§ 9601-75 (2000).
103 See Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 696-98 (cited in note 18) (attributing the
passage of CERCLA to publicity over the events at Love Canal).
104 Consider Richard L. Revesz and Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in Rich-
ard L. Revesz and Richard B. Stewart, eds, Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law
3, 8 (Resource for the Future 1995) (explaining that real estate purchasers must perform
extensive "environmental assessments, which depending on the circumstances, can include
extensive testing of soil and groundwater" in order to avoid subsequent landowner liability
under CERCLA).
105 See Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 698 (cited in note 18) ("At much less than the
cost of Superfund, tax incentives and informational campaigns to promote better diet and exer-
cise could probably have saved tens of thousands of lives per year.").
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hazardous-waste disposal facilities are a limited social problem.' Most
abandoned waste sites stand little chance of contaminating property
or drinking water and could have been remediated with a limited gov-
ernment program. '°  CERCLA is best suited to solving the problems at
a place like Love Canal. At that site, a large number of residential
homeowners had unwittingly purchased land from a single, solvent
chemical company that could be easily identified. When applied to
almost any other aspect of the problem of abandoned hazardous-
waste disposal sites, however, CERCLA has had unfortunate effects.
At many sites, some companies involved are insolvent, thereby impos-
ing excessive costs on those few companies that remain available.'O,
CERCLA also includes demanding cleanup standards, appropriate for
a residential community like Love Canal, but wasteful for rural or
undeveloped land. 7
Attributing the passage of CERCLA to cognitive dysfunction is
not new-many scholars have branded CERCLA as anecdote-driven
legislation."o The notion of anecdote-driven legislation, however, re-
fers to some exemplar of a social problem that becomes so vivid and
salient, that it instills an exaggerated sense of urgency in the public
eye. Because people can easily recall the vivid case of Love Canal, the
problem of abandoned hazardous-waste sites is cognitively available,
making it seem like a more common threat than it is."' Whatever role
cognitive availability played in the passage of statutes like CERCLA,
106 Compare United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Policy Analysis,
Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems 73 (Department of
Commerce 1987) (ranking hazardous-waste disposal as the nation's sixteenth greatest environ-
mental problem), with id at 93 (ranking the public perception of chemical waste disposal as the
nation's single greatest environmental problem).
107 Consider W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy 126-27 (Oxford 1998) ("[O]ften highly
publicized risks do not pose substantial risks to health but instead reflect excessive reactions to
minor hazards. The result is that the political pressures for government action are often the
greatest when the need for government policies is least.").
108 See Revesz and Stewart, The Superfund Debate at 7 (cited in note 104) (noting that the
CERCLA liability regime imposes joint and several liability on parties responsible for a con-
tamination site).
109 Indeed CERCLA sets broad regulatory standards that do not vary by context, often
producing absurd outcomes. See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: To-
ward Effective Risk Regulation 40 (Harvard 1993) (noting an especially absurd requirement
under CERCLA that clean waste sites must meet "relevant and appropriate" goals set under the
Safe Drinking Water Act resulted in "IBM in California ... hav[ing] to make the water its factory
discharges far cleaner than the ocean or the bay into which it normally pours it").
110 See, for example, Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 691-703 (cited in note 18) (discuss-
ing the Love Canal chemical spill that became a basis for legislative action); David A. Hyman, Lies
Damned Lies and Narrative, 73 Ind L J 797,800-07 (1998) (arguing that "[Il]egislatures-populated
by lawyers and exceedingly attuned to public pressure-are enthusiasts of anecdotal evidence")
(internal citations omitted).
Ill See Kuran and Sunstein, 51 Stan L Rev at 691-98 (cited in note 18).
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however, availability only explains why Congress adopted some re-
medial measure. Availability alone does not explain why the statute
represents a misguided effort. In fact, abandoned hazardous-waste
disposal facilities might have represented an unaddressed social prob-
lem in need of attention. A powerful anecdote like Love Canal might
have been just what was needed to fix the public's attention on the
issue and inspire congressional action. The real problem was not that
Congress passed legislation dealing with abandoned hazardous-waste
disposal facilities, but that it passed legislation that was tailored too
precisely to the situation at Love Canal. Similar stories can be told for
other environmental statutes, welfare reform, and tort reform."2
The problem of excessively tailored legislation is stunningly simi-
lar to the statistical vulnerabilities associated with regression analysis.
The observations that a statistician feeds into a regression analysis
invariably incorporate some error in the measurement of the parame-
ters in the model."3 This measurement error limits the ability of the
regression model to predict future observations, or the "validity" of
the regression model."' As statisticians note, the reliability of the ob-
servations necessarily limits the validity of the model."5 A regression
equation is blind to this concern. A regression analysis will produce a
unique equation that best fits the observations fed into the model,
even though observations invariably include some inherent variability.
Standard statistical techniques, however, account for the unreliability
of data. The regression equation itself provides a statistical assessment
of the predictive utility of the model known as R-squared."6 R-squared
measures how well the regression equation predicts actual data. A low
R-squared indicates that the regression equation is simply fitting
noise- there is no discernable regression pattern in the data-and has
no real predictive value. An equation with a low accompanying R-
squared could be used to make some prediction, but the prediction
would have no value.
The legislative process, however, contains no analogy to R-
squared. The legislative process includes no established test to assess
how well the regulatory solution a legislature adopts fits the real prob-
lem. To the extent that a legislature acts in response to an anecdote-
112 See Hyman, 73 Ind L J at 804-07 (cited in note 110).
113 See, for example, Jacob Cohen and Patricia Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/
Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences § 3.7.5 at 111-13 (Wiley 2d ed 1975).
114 Id § 3.7.6 at 113-15.
115 See Mary J. Allen and Wendy M. Yen, Introduction to Measurement Theory § 5.4 at 98
(Brooks/Cole 1979).
116 See Cohen and Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behav-
ioral Sciences § 3.5.3 at 94-95 (cited in note 113).
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driven crisis, it risks embracing a regulatory solution that fails to ad-
dress the social problem that underlies the anecdote. Even assuming
the legislators correctly understand the details of the story, those de-
tails are apt to be unique. Any single account of a social problem will
include idiosyncrasies. Indeed, the very fact that a story rises to the
attention of the national media almost ensures that it has unusual
characteristics. By adopting a regulatory solution carefully tailored to
fit a unique problem, a legislature is apt to be tailoring a regulatory
response to a problem that only rarely occurs, thereby undermining
efforts to address the underlying issues and likely creating unintended
consequences.
Even though courts, by definition, only review anecdotes, they are
less likely to implement excessively tailored regulatory solutions. Courts
can award only monetary damages and injunctive relief. The latter
remedy is usually narrowly tailored, but generally applies only to a
single party. Courts have little choice but to adopt simple solutions.
Also, courts will inevitably revisit an issue as new cases arise. When
different cases present the same social problems, they will do so in
different contexts, with different sets of idiosyncratic facts. The courts
will thus invariably notice that the facts of different cases necessarily
differ. The differences between cases perhaps explain why courts, rela-
tive to legislatures, tend to adopt modest resolutions to the disputes
before them. Courts commonly refuse to address issues outside of
those in the case before them even in instances in which it might be
prudent for them to do so."' Judges are certainly capable of hubris, but
the limited remedial authority of the courts limits the impact of their
hubris.
D. Courts Rely on Pattern Recognition
As Professor Sherwin notes in her comments on Professor Schauer's
article, human judgment sometimes manages to insulate people from
making common errors."8 She highlights analogical reasoning as a pal-
liative for many of the concerns that Professor Schauer notes. I would
add that the common law courts have also relied on the remarkable
human pattern-recognition skills to facilitate sensible lawmaking.
Repeated encounters with the same issues facilitate the remark-
able human ability to categorize. The human brain seems quite adept
117 See Sunstein, One Case at a Time at 3-5 (cited in note 9).
118 See generally Sherwin, 73 U Chi L Rev 919 (cited in note 20) (arguing that judges' con-
straint from precedent and analogical reasoning can to some extent debias judges from the cog-
nitive errors cited by Schauer).
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at identifying patterns."9 Replicating the ordinary human ability to
identify structure and patterns remains a challenge for artificial intel-
ligence researchers. Today, machines that can make calculations mil-
lions of times more rapidly than the human brain still cannot recog-
nize speech or handwriting with anything remotely like the accuracy
that every human possesses.'2° Chess-playing computers still barely
match the ability of chess grand masters, whose skills arise largely
from their ability to identify complex patterns among the pieces on
the chessboard."' Indeed, psychologists argue that people tend to see
patterns where none exist; superstition and myth arise largely from
beliefs in nonexistent patterns and relationships.
In developing the common law, judges have relied heavily on pat-
tern-recognition abilities. The process of common law evolution con-
sists largely of determining whether a new case is similar to older ones
or whether a new category or exception needs to be carved out. Con-
sider products liability law as an example. Products can, and have, in-
jured people in an almost infinite variety of ways. And yet the courts
in the United States have distilled this infinite variation into three
causes: manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to warn."'
Every injury a product can cause fits neatly into one of these three
causes. The courts have also developed a body of rules governing the
allocation of responsibility for injuries attributable to each of these
three causes.
The process of categorization simplifies the litigation process
enormously and ingeniously. Take, for example, the law governing
people who are injured while on someone else's property. Although
people enter the property of others for an infinite number of reasons,
the common law organizes them into four categories: invitees, licen-
sees, trespassers, and child trespassers.124 The duty a landowner owes is
119 See John R. Anderson, Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications 32-43 (Freeman 4th ed
1995) (discussing the cognitive process of pattern recognition in which "patterns are broken
down into smaller features," recombined, and connected with memory).
120 See John Taylor, Cognitive Systems Project InterAction Conference, Grand Challenge
Two-Neurocomputational Approaches to Speech and Language (2003) ("[Ilt is clear that despite
substantial progress over the last few years, human speech recognition performance still greatly
exceeds that achievable by machine."), online at http://www.iac3.com/grandchallengeO 2 .html
(visited June 11,2006).
121 See generally Game Over-Kasparov and the Machine (Thinkfilm 2003) (documenting
chess world champion Garry Kasparov's narrow defeat by a computer manufactured by IBM
dubbed "Deep Blue").
122 See Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in
Everyday Life 9-17 (Free 1991) (arguing that people tend automatically to see patterns in events.
sometimes even where there are none).
123 See Henderson and Twerski, 83 Cornell L Rev at 869 (cited in note 50).
124 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts §§ 232-36 at 591-615 (West 2001) (providing de-
tailed exposition of landowner duties to trespassers, licensees, invitees, and children).
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highest to an invitee, somewhat less to a licensee, and less still to a
trespasser, unless the trespasser is a child.", Some modern courts resist
using these categories, branding them a rigid formalism, and commen-
tators decry the deference to landowners that these categories have
come to reflect. 12 But these criticisms ignore the genius of the system
that has developed. The categorical approach distills the complex in-
quiry of how to determine who is responsible for an injury into a
handful of simple rules. To be sure, rules invariably misclassify some
cases. The application of the lesser duty owed to a trespasser doubtless
leaves some deserving trespasser without a remedy. But the individu-
alized application of a more generic standard (such as that the land-
owner owes due care to anyone on her property'27) is also apt to be
sufficiently fraught with complexities that it might well produce more
injustice than a wooden rule developed through experience, one case
at a time, by centuries of litigation.
Not only is the common law process remarkable at creating cate-
gories, it has amazing potential to identify similarities in seemingly
disparate cases. Consider the analogies courts have found to the quirky
Summers v Tice '2 case. The case arose from a hunting accident. Three
men went out hunting, proceeding through a field in a line. The center
man got ahead, and when a group of birds took flight before him, both
of his comrades carelessly fired at his position. One of the two com-
rades hit him with his shot. Owing to the similarity of their firearms
and situations, the court could not determine which of the two struck
him. Usually the burden of proving causation lies with the plaintiff,
which would have meant victory for both defendants, even though one
of them negligently caused the injury. The Summers court, however,
shifted the burden to the defendants. ' Decades later, a court review-
ing the liability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer found great value in
analogizing to Summers. In Sindell v Abbot Laboratories,'1 the court
125 See id.
126 See, for example, Rowland v Christian, 69 Cal 2d 108, 443 P2d 561 (1968) (rejecting the
formalistic categories of invitee, licensee, trespasser and holding that the defendant landowner
owed a reasonable duty of care). See also generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Licensees in
Landoccupiers' Liability Law-Should They Be Exterminated or Resurrected?, 55 Okla L Rev 67
(2002) (noting some courts' merger of the licensee and invitee categories).
127 See generally Rowland, 443 P2d 561.
128 33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P2d 1 (1948) (holding that two defendants who are both negligent are
joint and severally liable for a plaintiff's injuries when causation is undetermined but it is known
that only one of them caused the harm in fact).
129 Id at 3 ("When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that
the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest.").
130 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P2d 924 (1980) (holding several manufacturers of an identical chemical
that caused birth defects liable for pro rata shares of damages based on their respective shares of
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had determined that all manufacturers of a pharmaceutical were neg-
ligent in their marketing of the drug, but that the plaintiff could not
identify from which manufacturer she had purchased the drug. The
ability to find an analogous case with reasoning to reply upon facili-
tated the court's analysis of the Sindell case. The common law process
managed to highlight the similarities between such disparate events as
a hunting accident and modern pharmaceutical marketing. There are
certainly differences between the situations, but the Sindell court did
not have to start its reasoning from scratch.
Any of the simple categories that the courts have developed to re-
solve disputes is obviously open to criticism. The categories may be too
narrow or too broad, or might simply assign responsibility improperly.
But what is remarkable is how easily the common law courts have dis-
tilled massive complexity down into simple, sometimes elegant rules.
Rarely can that be said of any legislature. The courts adopt simple rules
based on rudimentary categories; legislatures adopt complex rules with
endless categorization, subcategorization, and nuanced calculation.
IV. CONCLUSION: AN INDETERMINATE ANALYSIS
Although courts can be maligned as myopic institutions that
sometimes make misguided social policy, their single-case approach
has virtues. The legislative approach avoids many of the pitfalls of the
single-minded focus of the courts on resolving only the dispute before
them. But at the same time, courts might well be developing sensible
heuristics for solving social dilemmas that legislatures might miss
while trying to overfit solutions to anecdotal accounts of social prob-
lems. Courts and legislatures alike are capable of creating misguided
laws. The question, from the perspective of cognitive psychology, is
what features of an underlying situation are best suited to resolving
the social issues raised.
Cognitive assessments stand much of the conventional thinking
about the lawmaking process on its head. Professor Schauer notes that
a cognitive approach undermines the virtues of rulemaking in response
to a concrete example.'3 ' But other aspects of the assessment of the
common law also get turned around. For example, consider the assess-
ment of the role of complexity. Many areas of law seem too complicated
for the common law courts to address and require a legislative ap-
proach. Conversely, the courts seem best able to implement rules that
require contextual balancing because legislatures cannot easily envi-
the market during the relevant time period, despite the fact that the manufacturer who actually
produced the batch that caused the instance of harm in question could not be identified).
131 See generally Schauer, 73 U Chi L Rev 883 (cited in note 3).
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sion all of the circumstances in which the balance they identify is to be
struck. The cognitive analysis, however, suggests exactly the opposite:
that courts will be best at developing adaptive rules for complex envi-
ronments while legislatures will do best at balancing policy interests.
The courts have been able to develop simple rules that manage com-
plex environments. The cognitive structure of the common law process
likely facilitates the process of identifying sensible rules. In particular,
the necessarily modest approach of courts creates multiple opportuni-
ties to slowly evolve rules that avoid many of the pitfalls likely to en-
snare legislatures that try to regulate the same issue. In contrast,
courts face many cognitive obstacles to implementing sensible cost-
benefit analysis. Courts are apt to see the probabilities associated with
the balance in a subjective format that can impede sensible assess-
ment of the risks and uncertainties.
Determining the relative strengths and weaknesses of lawmaking
from the bottom-up versus the top-down thus requires identifying the
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. And here I part
company with Professor Schauer's conclusions. Legislation seems best
for solving social problems that are not pushed into the public agenda
as a result of vivid anecdotes. Legislatures can manage lingering, long-
standing problems that facilitate careful study. When anecdotes drive
policy, legislatures cause problems. Curiously, the courts may be best
able to handle social problems that produce vivid disasters. Courts
seem well suited to categorizing disasters according to underlying simi-
larities, as has happened in products liability law and the law govern-
ing liability of landowners.
To some extent, the cognitive assessment of social problems pre-
sented in this Essay and in Professor Schauer's article inspires a reas-
sessment of the appropriate institution in which to resolve social prob-
lems. The courts have traditionally dealt with products liability and
might be thought to be best suited to approaching longstanding social
harms arising from products such as tobacco or high-fat foods. Legisla-
tures commonly respond to disasters such as 9/11 or the Enron scandal.
The cognitive assessment of the two modes of lawmaking, however,
suggests the opposite approach would be more sensible. The resolution
of the social problems presented by tobacco and fatty foods lies in
complex balancing of interests and sensible sifting of mountains of re-
search and data. To be sure, legislatures face political influences that
might make them ill suited to resolving such problems, but courts may
be too myopic to conduct this balancing. The cognitive perspective fa-
vors a legislative approach to these problems. In contrast, the courts,
with a long history of neatly categorizing and processing all manner of
accidents, might better assess disasters and uncover the underlying
forces that produced them more effectively than legislatures.
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